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Articles
Issuer Recovery of Insider Trading
Profits Under Section 25502.5 of the
California Corporation Code
Don Berger*
Insider trading-the use of confidential information not available
to the trading public to purchase or sell securities-is prohibited
under federal law by section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act' and Rule lOb-5 2 adopted by the Securities Exchange Commission
* Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; J.D., University
of California, Hastings College of Law, 1964; LL.M., University of Illinois, 1965.
1. 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1934): "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange -
(a)...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988): "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
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pursuant to that statutory provision.3 Such conduct is also prohibited
under provisions of the California Corporate Securities Law of 1968. 4
The traditional theoretical justification for prohibiting insider trad-
ing is based on the notion that allowing persons who have access to
non-public information to use it for securities trading will discourage
individual investors without access to such information from trading
in the securities markets. Thus, even though persistent arguments
have been made by some economists that insider trading is good for
the trading markets as a whole and should be permitted,3 the over-
whelming reaction in fact has consistently been to regard it as
"unfair" because it destroys the "level playing field" among parti-
cipants in the trading markets.
6
In recent years, however, the public objections to insider trading
have assumed larger dimensions. While at one time governmental
prosecution of small-time insider trading might have been regarded
by the general public as overzealous,7 the discovery of persistent,
3. The development and scope of the federal insider trading laws is detailed in D.C.
LANOEvooRT, INSIDER TRADiNo REuLATioN (1989).
4. 1968 Cal. Stat., ph. 88, sec. 2 at 279 (enacting CAL. CORP. CODE § 25402).
It is unlawful for an issuer or any person who is an officer, director or controlling
person of an issuer or any other person whose relationship to the issuer gives him
access, directly or indirectly, to material information about the issuer not generally
available to the public, to purchase or sell any security of the issuer in this state at
a time when he knows material information about the issuer gained from such
relationship which would significantly affect the market price of that security and
which is not generally available to the public, and which he knows is not intended
to be so available, unless he has reason to believe that the person selling to or
buying from him is also in possession of the information.
Id.
1968 Cal. Stat., ch. 88, sec. 2 at 280 (enacting Cal. Corp. Code § 25502).
Any person who violates Section 25402 shall be liable to the person who purchases
a security from him or sells a security to him, for damages equal to the difference
between the price at which such security was purchased or sold and the market value
which such security would have had at the time of the purchase or sale if the
information known to the defendant had been publicly disseminated prior to that
time and a reasonable time had elapsed for the market to absorb the information,
plus interest at the legal rate, unless the defendant proves that the plaintiff knew
the information or that the plaintiff would have purchased or sold at the same price
even if the information had been revealed to him.
Id. See generally Review of Selected California Legislation, 20 PAC. L.J. 423, 465-66 (1988).
5. See, e.g., H. MANNE, INsIDER TnAaDiN AND Tm STOCK MAMUET (1966). See also
Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1983); Dooley,
Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1 (1980); Wu, An Economist
Looks at Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 260 (1968).
6. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 875 (2d Cir. 1968) ("the rule
[against insider trading] is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities
marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to
material information").
7. In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the weight of the federal government
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systematic insider trading activities yielding millions of dollars in
profit to well-known securities professionals such as Ivan Boesky and
Dennis Levine has changed the underlying objection to insider trading
to one of basic morality and cultural values. Comments such as Ivan
Boesky's "Greed is all right ... greed is healthy" 8 might have been
inspirational to his audience of business school students; the reaction
of both the investing public without access to Mr. Boesky's sources
of inside information and the non-investing general public was one
of moral indignation. As described by one leading writer, "Congress
has begun to see the problem in more fundamental cultural terms as
a manifestation of undue greed among the already well-to-do, worthy
of legislative intervention if for no other reason than to send a
message of censure on behalf of the American people.'' 9
At the federal level, the first major legislative response to these
revelations of widespread and large scale insider trading activities
was the enactment of the 1984 Insider Trading Sanctions Act.' 0 The
major new provision of this statute empowered the Securities Ex-
change Commission (SEC or Commission hereafter) to seek the
judicial imposition of civil fines of up to three times the amount of
the illegally obtained profits from insider trading." Compared to the
previous maximum monetary liability in SEC civil enforcement ac-
tions-judicially ordered disgorgement of profits only12-the addi-
tional imposition of civil fines was thought to create a meaningful
deterrent to potential violators.
The subsequent unravelling of the Dennis Levine-Ivan Boesky
scandal, and the discovery of post-1984 insider trading activities by
securities industry professionals caused a second Congressional en-
actment-the 1988 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act.' 3 This statute, too, expressed Congress' reaction to the new and
was exerted in the form of an ultimately unsuccessful criminal prosecution against an employee
of a printing company who had made trading profits of $30,000 over a period of fourteen
months.
8. Speech to business school students, 1985, quoted in 134 Cong. Rec. H7469 (daily ed.
Sept. 13, 1988).
9. D. LANoEVOORT, supra note 3, at 1.
10. Pub. Law 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (enacting 15 U.S.C. § 78a, c, o, t, u, ff).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988).
12. D. LANGEVOORT, supra note 3, at 227 ("[tlhe courts have recognized this form of
ancillary equitable relief, as an appropriate incident to the Commission's enforcement powers-
even though the statute itself does not affirmatively grant ... such authority"). See also
Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions Brought by the SEC, 1977 DuKE L.J.
641.
13. Pub. Law 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (enacting 15 U.S.C. § 78a, b, c, k, o, t, u,
kk). See Lavoie, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 22 REv.
SEC. & Cottionrrms RPo. 1 (1989).
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widespread public indignation based on notions of morality and
fairness. As stated by Representative John Dingell (D-Mich.):
Underlying the explosion of [insider trading] is a certain economic
and social Darwinism which holds that the strong were meant to
prevail over the weak, and the strong have no accountability. They
are free to do what they want and their success proves the rightness
of their course of conduct ... Well, this bill will, in a limited way,
control and restrain greed.
14
The previous references to the new public reaction against insider
trading and to the new federal statutes were made for the limited
purpose of painting a backdrop. The substantive focus of this article
is not to deal with the federal law of insider trading but with a newly
enacted and so far unique piece of state legislation-the addition of
section 25502.5 to the California Corporations Code through the
enactment of S.B. 2578 in 1988.15
This article posits that the California Legislature enacted section
25502.5 too hastily in a milieu of "me too-ism." Further, this article
expresses the author's belief that section 25502.5 represents an emo-
tional legislative response to insider trading that will likely generate
litigation that could and should have been avoided through better
drafting.1
6
Substantiation for these conclusions will be provided by a substan-
tive comparison of section 25502.5 to section 16(b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act,17 the presumed model for the new California
provision. Judicial application and interpretation of section 16(b) will
14. 134 Cong. Rec. H7469 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1988).
15. 1988 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1339, sec. 4 at 4999 (West) (enacting CAL. CoRP. CODE §
25502.5). S.B. 2578, enacted as Chapter 1339 in 1988, made other changes in the California
Corporate Securities Law of 1968. It added section 25213.3 to the California Corporation
Code which requires the Commissioner of Corporations to suspend or bar an employee or
officer of a broker-dealer if that person has been convicted of violating the anti-fraud provisions
of the Corporate Securities Law. Id. sec. 1, at 4998 (enacting CAL. Coiu,. CODE § 25213.3).
Additional provisions of S.B. 2578 amended sections 25540 and 25541 to increase the criminal
penalties for violations to $250,000 and prison terms from one year in a county jail to two,
three or five years in a state prison. Id. sec. 5, at 4999 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 25540);
id. sec. 6, at 4999 (amending § 25541). A bill substantially identical to Chapter 1339 was
introduced in 1987, but was vetoed by Governor Deukmejian because of concerns that the bill
had overbroad applications. Deukmejian, Governor's Veto Message to the Senate on SB 1666;
SENATE J., 4117, Oct. 1, 1987 (1987 Reg. Sess.). See Review of Selected California Legislation,
20 PAc. L.J. 423, 466 n.6 (1988).
16. Lest these critical remarks be misunderstood, the author of this article firmly believes
that insider trading should be prohibited and violators subjected to appropriate civil and
criminal liability.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
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be relied on to point out the potential problems in the application
of section 25502.5 to private litigation.
I. SECTION 25502.5: THE BASICS
Newly enacted Section 25502.5 of the California Corporations Code
provides that any person who violates section 25402 by trading on
the basis of non-public information can be held liable to the issuer
whose securities were traded.' 8 Encompassed by the term "any per-
son," as a result of the cross-reference to section 25402, are officers,
directors and controlling persons of an issuer as well as "any other
person whose relationship to the issuer gives him access, directly or
indirectly, to material information about the issuer not generally
available to the public."' 19 The monetary liability imposed by section
25502.5 can be for up to three times the amount of the illegally
obtained profit.2 0 An action to recover such liability can be instituted
by the issuer or a shareholder of the issuer.2 1 A person found liable
must also pay the reasonable costs and attorney's fee of the successful
plaintiff.22
A defendant's liability must, however, be reduced by the amount
such defendant has paid in an action brought by the SEC involving
the same trading activities. 23 If such an SEC action is still pending
without final resolution, the California court must delay the rendition
of a California judgment until the federal action is concluded. 24 The
remedy provided by section 25502.5 does not apply to issuers having
assets of less than $1 million and a class of equity securities held of
record by 500 or more persons.
2
1
II. SECTION 16(B) UNDERPINNINGS
The only statutory equivalent to section 25502.5 can be found in
section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act26-the so-called
18. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25502.5(a) (West Supp. 1989).
19. ChA. CORP. CODE § 25402 (Vest 1977).
20. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25502.5(a) (West Supp. 1989).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 25502.5(b).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 25502.5(d).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). Under federal law, the monetary liability for insider trading
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"short swing profit" provision. It is therefore logical to compare
these two provisions. Section 16(b) has been the subject of extensive
litigation in the federal courts. Presumably, therefore, its historical
application and interpretation by the federal courts can be utilized
to analyze the meaning and potential impact of section 25502.5 of
the California Corporation Code.
Except for new section 25502.5 of the California Corporations
Code, no other state presently has a statutory provision making a
person using inside information liable to the issuer of that security.
A brief mention of insider trading liability to the issuer of the
traded security under non-statutory state law is in order, however.
Up to the present time, the imposition of such liability has been
approved in only three states. 27 Such non-statutory liability under
state law has been rejected by two courts.28 The controversial aspect
of such liability is that normally the issuer in whose favor the
monetary recovery for insider trading is sought has sustained no
monetary damages from the insider's use of confidential information
for trading purposes. 29 The enactment in California of section 25502.5
thus seems to be an important legislative decision that the absence
of monetary injury to the issuer of the traded security is less impor-
tant than the deterrent of insider trading by superimposing issuer-
directed profit disgorgement to the already existing liability towards
the person whose securities the insider purchased or towards the
person to whom the insider sold.
Section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act imposes liability
on officers, directors and beneficial owners30 to the issuer of the
securities that were traded. 31 Designed for the purpose of "preventing
the unfair use of information" obtained by such statutory insiders,
the statute provides for the disgorgement of profits obtained by them
in civil cases normally consists of a disgorgement to the government of the illegally obtained
profits and possibly the payment of a civil fine. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988). However, in a
private suit, the inside trader must disgorge illegally obtained profits to any "contemporaneous
trader". 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988).
27. In re ORFA Securities Litigation, 654 F. Supp. 1449 (D.C. N.J. 1987); Brophy v.
Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494,
248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
28. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying Indiana law); Schein v.
Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975).
29. Wimberly, Corporate Recovery of Insider Trading Profits at Common Law, 8 CORP.
L. REV. 197 (1985).
30. A "beneficial owner" is any person who owns more than ten percent of a class of
equity securities registered pursuant to section 12 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. 15
U.S.C. § 78p(a).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
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from any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, occurring within
less than six months.32
Despite their basic underlying similarity, section 25502.5 and sec-
tion 16(b) differ in one important respect. Section 16(b) liability is
not dependent upon the defendant's actual knowledge and use of
"inside" information. 33 A statutory insider is liable under section
16(b) if any two transactions yielding a profit occurred within the
specified time period. In other words, liability is the result of the
mere status as a statutory insider of the trading person. Section
25502.5, on the other hand, requires that the defendant must have
also violated section 25402 of the California Corporations Code.
34
Thus, the California statute clearly requires the use of inside infor-
mation by the defendant; mere status as a "statutory insider" is not
sufficient.
On the other hand, section 25502.5 is broader than section 16(b).
The federal provision requires a pairing of two transactions occurring
within less than six months. 35 The California provision, on the other
hand, permits the imposition of profit liability for any one transaction
if inside information was in fact used.
36
Beyond this clear difference between the two statutes, varying
degrees of doubt and uncertainty about the intent and meaning of
section 25502.5 arise. These will be examined below by attempting
to glean the meaning of the California provision in light of the
history of section 16(b), its federal philosophical parent.
III. THE ROLE OF THE PLAINTIFF
The language of section 25502.5 indicates obliquely, rather than
expressly, that the issuer of the traded security or a person suing in
32. Id.
33. 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITS AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 10.01(6) (1989).
Although the liability under Section 16(b) is designed to limit the opportunity for
insiders to trade to their advantage on the basis of inside information, it is not
necessary for plaintiff to establish that in fact insiders traded on the basis of such
information. The section's operation is prophylactic; it is designed to preclude
transactions with a potential for abuse irrespective of actual abuse.
Id. An exception to this strict liability doctrine is the so-called "unorthodox transaction"
concept applied by the Supreme Court in Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973). See Note, Exceptions to Liability Under Section 16(b): A Systematic
Approach, 87 YALE L.J. 1430 (1978).
34. See supra note 4.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
36. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25502.5(a).
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the right of the issuer is an appropriate plaintiff because subsection
(a) makes the defendant liable for the reasonable costs and attorney's
fees of these two types of plaintiffs. 37
A. The Demand Requirement
Unfortunately, the statutory language does not answer several
crucial issues pertaining to the role of the plaintiff in section 25502.5
litigation if that plaintiff is someone other than the issuer. Referred
to in subsection (c) as a "shareholder" and in subsection (a) as a
"person who institutes an action under this section in the right of
the issuer," such a plaintiff presumably is pursuing what would
normally be regarded as a derivative suit, since the language of the
statute clearly makes the violator "liable to the issuer of the security
purchased or sold."
'38
Derivative suits, under section 800 of the California Corporations
Code, are subject to several prerequisites. The plaintiff must make
a pre-litigation demand on the board of directors, to rectify the
wrong done to the corporation, unless such demand is excused as
futile.39 Furthermore, a derivative plaintiff must be a so-called "con-
temporaneous owner," i.e., must have been a shareholder of the
corporation at the time the alleged wrong to the corporation occurred.
This requirement discourages plaintiffs from purchasing shares simply
for the sake of instituting litigation. 40 A derivative plaintiff can also
be required, upon motion by the corporation or the defendant, to
post a bond in an amount not to exceed $50,000 as security for the
potential litigation expenses of the corporation and the defendant. 4'
Whether these requirements applicable to the normal derivative
suit are applicable in section 25502.5 litigation brought by a person
in the right of the issuer is at least debatable. The pre-litigation
demand principle is not spelled out in the statute; subsection (c) only
refers to the possibility of a shareholder's allegation to the board
that a violation has occurred, and then only in the context of
37. Id. ("Any person ... who violates Section 25402 ... shall be liable to the issuer of
the security or to a person who institutes an action under this section in the right of the issuer
of the security for reasonable costs and attorney's fees.") (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 800(b)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
40. Id. § 800(b)(1).
41. Id. § 800(c), (d).
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imposing upon the board a duty of a good faith reaction. 42 There is
no cross-reference in section 25502.5 to section 800.
The absence of an express reference to the demand requirement
may be regarded as simply an implied declaration of legislative intent
to subject this kind of litigation to the requirements of a "normal"
derivative under section 800. On the other hand, section 16(b), the
federal sibling of section 25502.5, expressly requires that the share-
holder make a pre-litigation demand on the board of directors; 43 such
a shareholder can only sue derivatively if the board fails to take
action under section 16(b) within sixty days after the shareholder's
demand or if the board improperly refuses to act. It must be
emphasized that the federal demand requirement is express in section
16(b) even though Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-
the provision setting forth the general requirements for all derivative
suits in the federal courts-already contains a pre-litigation demand
requirement. 44
Thus, a dilemma results under section 25502.5-is there a demand
requirement because such a suit is a "normal" derivative suit? Or is
such a demand permitted but not required because, unlike section
16(b), no specific requirement is expressed, thus creating a difference
between these two philosophically related provisions?
B. Contemporaneous Ownership: Required or Not?
The "contemporaneous ownership" principle is also not expressly
referred to in section 25502.5. Arguably, the absence of such a
requirement simply demonstrates a legislative intent to regard section
25502.5 suits as "normal" derivative suits and thus subject to the
contemporaneous ownership requirement of section 800. However,
section 25502.5's relationship to section 16(b) is once again grounds
for a contrary argument. The federal courts have consistently held
that although section 16(b) suits brought by a shareholder are deriv-
ative in nature for some purposes, a shareholder plaintiff need not
have been a "contemporaneous owner." 4 s
42. Id. § 800(c).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) ("Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity
... by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of
the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request
.") (emphasis added).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
45. Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra
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Apart from the express language in section 16(b) permitting "any"
security owner to sue, dispensing with the "contemporaneous own-
ership" requirement can also be justified on policy grounds. Section
16(b) can only be enforced by private litigation; the Securities Ex-
change Commission has no authority to initiate 16(b) actions.4 6 In
order to obtain maximum enforcement, section 16(b) is normally
interpreted liberally in favor of plaintiffs.
It is debatable whether the same rationale should apply to private
actions under section 25502.5. The California provision is triggered
when insiders in fact have used inside information, whereas 16(b)
liability is imposed even if no inside information has been used.
47
The losing defendant in a section 25502.5 action has violated section
25402 and therefore can be prosecuted criminally.48 There is thus not
the same need as in section 16(b) actions to make life easy for the
plaintiff by eliminating the contemporaneous ownership requirement
as a matter of policy.
The statute's lack of clarity with regard to both the demand and
the contemporaneous ownership requirements is unfortunate. Since
arguments for both the existence and the non-existence for these
requirements can be made, as pointed out above, only litigation or
legislative amending action will provide an ultimate answer.
IV. DEFENDANT'S DILEMMA: POTENTL DOUBLE LIABILITY
Section 25502.5 imposes upon a violator of section 25402
damages in an amount up to three times the difference between the
price at which the security was purchased or sold and the market
value which the security would have had at the time of the purchase
or sale if the information known to the defendant had been publicly
disseminated prior to that time and a reasonable time had elapsed
for the market to absorb the information . .9
For example, assume Smith, a vice-president of Acme, Inc., knowing
confidential information about Acme, purchases 1,000 Acme shares
note 31, at § 10.02 ("Although Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
generally that plaintiffs in a derivative action have been shareholders at the time of the wrong
complained of this provision is not applicable to a 16(b) action in view of the fact that 16(b)
expressly provides that any security holder may initiate the action.").
46. 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 33, at § 10.02.
47. See supra note 36, and accompanying text.
48. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25540 (West Supp. 1989).
49. Id. § 25502.5(a).
230
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for $20 per share based on that information. Upon release of that
information to the public, the market price of Acme shares rises to
$40 per share. Smith sells her 1,000 shares, making a $20,000 profit.
Section 25502.5 would subject Smith to a maximum liability of
$60,000 to Acme, Inc., assuming that the trading price of Acme
shares would have risen to $40 had the confidential information been
made public prior to Smith's purchase.
Such liability, however, must be reduced "by any amount paid by
the defendant in a proceeding brought by the Securities and Exchange
Commission with respect to the same transaction or transactions
under the federal Insider Trading Sanctions Act ... or any other
act . . ."0 Thus, if the SEC had brought a civil action against Smith
as a result of which she had made a disgorgement of her profits,
and perhaps paid an additional civil fine, her liability to Acme, Inc.
under section 25502.5 would be reduced or completely eliminated
correspondingly. Section 25502.5(b) thus clearly evinces an intent to
protect the defendant against double liability, at least to a limited
extent.
However, the concern with potential multiple liability underlying
the reduction of liability under section 25502.5(b) leaves open the
possibility of multiple liability in related situations. Only amounts
paid by the defendant "in a proceeding brought by the Securities
Exchange Commission" can be used as an off-set to section 25502.5
liability.5 Thus, since the SEC cannot bring section 16(b) actions
5 2
amounts paid by the defendant to the issuer of the traded security
under section 16(b) presumably cannot be used to reduce 25502.5
liability. Nor can amounts paid by the defendant to a private plaintiff
under section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act be so used.53 Nor
presumably can amounts paid by the defendant to a private plaintiff
under California Corporation Code section 25502 be used to reduce
that defendant's 25502.5 liability. Whether multiple liability was
indeed intended to remain in these non-SEC action situations is
highly questionable; but the principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius 4 would seemingly lead to the conclusion that such multiple
liability potentially exists.
50. Id. § 25502.5(b).
51. Id.
52. See supra, note 46.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-I (1988).
54. "Specific inclusion of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of others not
mentioned." R. KELso & C. KEIso, StUDYING LAw: AN INTRODUCTION 273 (1984). There is
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V. SMALL CORPORATION EXCLUSION
The liability created by section 25502.5 is only applicable when the
issuer whose securities were traded has "total assets in excess of one
million dollars ($1,000,000) and ... a class of equity security held
of record by 500 or more persons." ' s The policy rationale for
excluding smaller issuers from section 25502.5 presumably was the
fear of unduly complicating the capitalization and sale of small
enterprises. The specific exclusionary criteria raise some concern. The
same criteria apply under section 12(g)(1) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act56 with regard to the registration with the S.E.C. of
securities not registered on a national securities exchange under
section 12(a) of that statute.5 7 Unfortunately, that symmetry between
section 25502.5(d) and section 12(g)(1) is illusory. Section 12(h) 8 in
effect authorizes the Securities Exchange Commission to change the
criteria of section 12(g)(1), and the S.E.C. has indeed exercised that
power. Currently the section 12(g)(1) registration requirement, under
Rule 12g-1, 59 only applies to issuers having more than $5 million in
assets. It is, of course, possible that section 25502.5's reference to
$1 million was made purposefully, i.e., to include within the section's
scope issuers with more than $1 million but less than $5 million in
assets. One cannot totally resist the thought, however, that this is
just one more instance of problematic draftsmanship in a too hastily
enacted piece of legislation. In similar instances the California leg-
islature has previously attempted to maintain numerical symmetry
between state and federal requirements. Thus, the eligibility require-
ment for statutory close corporation status was increased to thirty-
five shareholders6° when Congress adopted that numerical limitation
case authority holding that the federal law on insider trading does not permit the imposition
of liability for the same transaction under both section 10(b) and section 16(b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act. National Westminster Bancorp NJ v. Leone, 702 F. Supp. 1132
(D.N.J. 1988).
55. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25502.5(d). Prior drafts of section 25502.5 did not exempt small
or closely held corporations. See Review of Selected California Legislation, 20 PAC. L.J. 423,
466 n.6 (1989).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1975).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 781.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 781(h).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-I (1988).
60. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a) (west Supp. 1989).
1990 / Issuer Recovery of Insider Trading Profits
in section 1361 of the Internal Revenue Code for S corporation tax
status .61
VI. UTILITY OF ISSUER RECOVERY OF INSIDER TRADING PROFITS
The preceding ruminations have dealt with problems of drafts-
manship. These can be solved by judicial interpretation and appli-
cation of the statute in the years to come, unless it is amended to
obviate such interpretive questions.
A perhaps more fundamental question remains. Is the creation of
a statutory remedy to allow issuer recovery of insider trading profits
a pragmatically useful remedy so that its utilization will be a mean-
ingful deterrent to such trading activities? The crucial point here is
that section 25502.5 recovery has a condition precedent attached to
it-such recovery is based on the defendant's having violated section
25402. Proof of a section 25402 violation requires a showing of
defendant's actual use of inside information. Ever since its enactment
in 1968, section 25502 has given private plaintiffs who dealt with an
"insider" a damage remedy for that insider's violation of section
25402. Yet no appellate case involving these two sections is referenced
in the annotated California Corporation Code. No trial court level
private suits involving these two sections seem to have ever been
brought. In other words, section 25402 seems to have remained
moribund. It is therefore highly unlikely that section 25502.5 will
cause a change in that litigational void. It is difficult to escape the
conclusion that California Corporation Code section 25502.5 was
enacted in an emotional milieu influenced by the flurry of contem-
poraneous federal legislative activity caused by high-visibility miscon-
duct on the part of the Wall Street professionals rather than by a
detached analysis of the need for such legislation.
61. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (,Vest Supp. 1987).

